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I. INTRODUCTION

Misery underlies Malaysia’s expanding export industry. The
misery is underpinned by social and economic factors related to the
working conditions created by Malaysia’s migrant labor policies. A
lack of enforceable international labor standards allows the Malaysian
government to depress the wages and social rights of migrant workers
in Malaysia, 1 thereby depressing the global manufacturing labor
market by undercutting the bargaining power of manufacturing
laborers around the world. 2
Independent reports assessing the social conditions of migrant
workers in Malaysia show that Malaysian government officials are
implicated in incidents of harassing legal migrant workers; in one such
incident, industry health inspectors discovered that a sick factory
worker suffered from an infection and rather than provide treatment,
the inspectors reported the worker to government officials who arrested
her, imprisoned her, and threatened her with deportation while her
condition grew worse. 3 Many layers of Malaysian government—health
workers, police, magistrates, and prison officials—were involved in the
abuse of this particular migrant laborer. 4 Furthermore, the conditions
that migrant laborers live in can be fatal—the Nepal embassy in
Malaysia notes that since 2005, an average of twenty-five Nepalese
workers in Malaysia dies every month because of “squalid living and
working conditions, stress, work pressure, and family pressure and lack
of rest.” 5
1. See infra Part IV.
2. See infra Part III.
3. WORKER RIGHTS CONSORTIUM, ASSESSMENT PROLEXUS BHD. (HONSIN APPAREL)
MALAYSIA FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STATUS 2 (2014), available at
http://www.workersrights-test.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/WRC-Assessment-reProlexus-Bhd-Malaysia-4.23.2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/AXD2-EAYT].
4. Id.
5. Workers live in unhygienic and dangerous conditions with ten people sleeping in a
single room in shifts. Ariel Ramchandani, Forced Labor Is the Backbone of the World’s
Electronics Industry, THE ATLANTIC (June 28, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/
archive/2018/06/malaysia-forced-labor-electronics/563873/ [https://perma.cc/L8US-M3KJ]. In
2016, the Nepal embassy noted that over 300 Nepali workers (it is not clear which industry these
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The impact of the poor social conditions experienced by
Malaysian migrant workers is not confined to Malaysia and there are
spillover effects that are felt in the United States. 6 While the economic
hardship of manufacturing workers in the United States is often
attributed to robots and automation, the growth of Malaysian low-wage
manufacturing in the 1990s precipitated the decline of American
manufacturing in the 2000s. 7 Research shows that the automation of
manufacturing plays a smaller part in the decline of US manufacturing
jobs than is popularly believed and that many US manufacturing jobs
have not gone to robots but rather to assembly-intensive manufacturing
jobs in countries, 8 like Malaysia, where forced labor artificially deflates
the wage burden on employers and undercuts the competitiveness of
US labor. 9 To put the scale of harm caused to American workers in
perspective—the estimated six million manufacturing jobs that were
lost by the United States to low-wage countries between 2000 and 2010
is larger than the number of jobs lost in the United States during the
Great Depression. 10
The various systems in place that regulate labor at an international
level 11 provide no defense against the damaging spillover effects of the
Malaysian government’s policies that exploit migrant labor while
diminishing the wages of migrants in Malaysia and manufacturing
workers came from) had died in Malaysia (the Government of Nepal now bans seeking jobs
there). Aishwardeep Kaur, Guess How Much Migrant Workers Pay to Enter Malaysia, CILISOS
(May 8, 2018), https://cilisos.my/5-ways-we-can-improve-the-working-conditions-of-migrantsin-malaysia/ [https://perma.cc/R9UV-TM64]. The average number of deaths is around 300 per
year since 2005 with the majority of deaths being attributable to cardiac arrest. Report: 386
Nepalese Migrant Workers Died Here in 2016, FREE MALAYSIA TODAY (Jan. 21, 2017),
https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2017/01/21/report-386-nepalese-migrantworkers-died-here-in-2016/ [https://perma.cc/T5VU-G6YK].
6. See infra Section II.A.3.
7. Susan Houseman et al., Offshoring Bias in U.S. Manufacturing, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 111,
112-14 (2011), available at https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.25.2.111 [https://perma.cc/ZF9LKH5L].
8. Susan N. Houseman, Understanding the Decline of U.S. Manufacturing Employment,
25 UPJOHN INST. EMP. RES. (2018), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.25.2.111
[https://perma.cc/5BEA-C7H7].
9. See Gwynn Guildford, The epic mistake about manufacturing that’s cost Americans
millions of jobs, QUARTZ (May 3, 2018), https://qz.com/1269172/the-epic-mistake-aboutmanufacturing-thats-cost-americans-millions-of-jobs/ [https://perma.cc/9BY6-MRHC].
10. Robert D. Atkinson et al., INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., WORSE THAN THE
GREAT DEPRESSION: WHAT EXPERTS ARE MISSING ABOUT AMERICAN MANUFACTURING’S
DECLINE 4 (2012).
11. See infra Part IV.
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laborers around the world. 12 Evidence of the growing frustration with
the lack of effective international labor regulation can be seen in the
Trump administration’s executive order in 2017, demanding an
investigation into the relationship between trade with certain trading
partners and “employment and wage growth in the United States.”13
The nexus of domestic labor conditions, international labor conditions,
and free trade is likely to inform much of the debate over the 2020 US
Presidential election on international relations and the economy14 and
this Note contributes to that debate with the contention that:
a) Malaysia, a major trade partner of the United States, is
illegally providing regulatory subsidies 15 to its export industry
with pro-business policies that strip away the rights of migrant
workers to attract foreign companies with a “continuous . . .
stream of labor” and “harmonious industrial relations[.]” 16
b) The negative economic impact of Malaysia’s migrant labor
policy on US manufacturing laborers 17 makes Malaysian exports
into the US subject to sanction under Title Nineteen, Section 1671
12. See Houseman et al., supra note 8.
13. Exec. Order No. 13,786, 82 Fed. Reg. 18110 (2017) (“Topics on Which Commerce
and USTR Seek Information to assist Commerce and USTR in preparing the Report,
commenters should submit information related to one or more of the assessments called for in
the Executive Order: For each identified trading partner with which the United States had a
significant trade deficit in goods in 2016, the Report shall: (a) Assess the major causes of the
trade deficit including, as applicable, differential tariffs, non-tariff barriers, injurious dumping,
injurious government subsidization, intellectual property theft, forced technology transfer,
denial of worker rights and labor standards, and any other form of discrimination against the
commerce of the United States or other factors contributing to the deficit; (b) assess whether the
trading partner is, directly or indirectly, imposing unequal burdens on, or unfairly discriminating
in fact against, the commerce of the United States by law, regulation, or practice and thereby
placing the commerce of the United States at an unfair disadvantage; (c) assess the effects of the
trade relationship on the production capacity and strength of the manufacturing and defense
industrial bases of the United States; (d) assess the effects of the trade relationship on
employment and wage growth in the United States; and (e) identify imports and trade practices
that may be impairing the national security of the United States.”).
14. See Tara Golshan & Dylan Scott, Democrats Are on the Brink of Completely
Reorienting Their Party on Trade, VOX (Mar. 30, 2019), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2019/2/18/18215442/2020-democratic-presidential-candidates-policies-trade
[https://perma.cc/Y7KU-QWVN].
15. See infra Section II.A.
16. See infra note 20; Nicola Piper, Marie Segrave & R. Napier-Moore, What’s in a
Name? Distinguishing forced labour, trafficking and slavery, 2015(5) ANTI-TRAFFICKING REV.
1, 1 (2015), http://www.antitraffickingreview.org/index.php/atrjournal/article/view/133/133
[https://perma.cc/24C2-FMBQ].
17. See infra Section II.A.
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of the United States Code—the countervailing duty (“CVD”)
statute. 18

This Note proceed as follows. Part II gives a brief overview of the
CVD statute, describes the process by which the CVD statute is applied
to imports deemed to have benefited from a trade subsidy, and frames
the problem of Malaysia’s migrant labor policy as an issue that could
be addressed by countervailing duty law. Part III assesses whether
countervailing duty law is a viable solution to the problem by analyzing
the recognized application of the CVD statute to subsidies. Part IV
addresses potential policy concerns implicated in using trade law to
bridge gaps created by a lack of international labor market regulation.
Part V concludes that even though the use of trade law is an imperfect
solution, the ends of providing a needed disincentive to worker
exploitation justifies the means because of the lack of other viable
alternatives.
II. THE NEXUS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DOMESTIC
LABOR
The high volume of migrant workers in Malaysia, coupled with
the prevalence of forced labor, 19 means that many laborers in Malaysia
are not able to bargain for wages; accordingly, workers in the United
States suffer because Malaysia is a major producer of goods for export
and Malaysian migrant labor policy places downward pressure on the
wages of American workers in the manufacturing sector. If a
manufacturer is interested in moving a part of its production facilities
to Malaysia, it is likely to encounter the Malaysian Investments and
Development Authority (“MIDA”). MIDA advertises Malaysia as
“heaven for foreign companies” and offers export manufacturers a
package of pro-business policies that promise to provide a
“continuous . . . stream of labor” together with “harmonious industrial
18. What are Anti-Dumping (AD) & Countervailing Duties (CVD)?, U.S. CUSTOMS &
BORDER PROT. (July 24, 2018), https://help.cbp.gov/app/answers/detail/a_id/216/~/antidumping-%28ad%29-and-countervailing-duties-%28cvd%29 [https://perma.cc/5RVS-DLFU].
19. Experts in the area of forced labor and human trafficking will urge caution in
conflating the two concepts because although there is a close relationship between debt bondage,
forced labor, and human trafficking—the concepts in this area are terms of art that need to be
understood independently. See Piper, Segrave & Napier-Moore, supra note 16, at 1–9. For the
purposes of this Note, a clear line is not always drawn between debt bonded labor, trafficked
labor, and forced labor in the Malaysian export industry.
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relations.” 20 While the advertised benefits to manufacturers of
profitability and harmonious production are no doubt tantalizing, the
unfortunate reality behind MIDA’s offer is that it is underwritten by
forced labor and human trafficking. 21 The Government of Malaysia has
constructed the benefits that MIDA offers to manufacturers—
characterized, below, as regulatory subsidies 22—by creating a system
that keeps the costs of migrant labor artificially low while forcing labor
markets in other countries to compete with depressed labor costs. 23 The
following sections provide support for the central argument that the
Government of Malaysia’s migrant labor policies are a form subsidy to
Malaysian export manufacturers that the United States can sanction
with the CVD statute. 24
A. “Regulatory Subsidy,” “Social Dumping,” and “Trade
Injury”
The CVD statute enables the United States Department of
Commerce (“Commerce“), in response to a petition from a domestic
plaintiff that alleges harm as a result of imported goods, to neutralize
government subsidies that harm US domestic industry through the
application of a tariff calculated to offset the subsidy. 25 The CVD
20. Why Malaysia, MALAYSIAN INV. DEV. AUTH., http://www.mida.gov.my/home/whymalaysia/posts/ [https://perma.cc/88HT-T7TU].
21. See 2017 Trafficking in Persons Report, infra note 109.
22. See infra Part II.
23. See infra Sections II.C.2 and II.C.3.
24. Joel P. Trachtman, International Regulatory Competition, Externalization, and
Jurisdiction, 34 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 47, 92 (1993).
25. If the [Department of Commerce] determines that the government of a country
or any public entity within the territory of a country is providing, directly or indirectly,
a countervailable subsidy with respect to the manufacture, production, or export of a
class or kind of merchandise imported, or sold (or likely to be sold) for importation,
into the United States, and
(2) in the case of merchandise imported from a Subsidies Agreement country, the
Commission determines that—
(A) an industry in the United States—(i) is materially injured, or (ii) is threatened
with material injury, or
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded, by
reason of imports of that merchandise or by reason of sales (or the likelihood of sales)
of that merchandise for importation, then there shall be imposed upon such
merchandise a countervailing duty, in addition to any other duty imposed, equal to
the amount of the net countervailable subsidy.
19 U.S.C. § 1671 (2012).
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statute gives Commerce the authority to unilaterally impose a CVD26
on goods from countries that, after a period of investigation, are
deemed to have benefited from an impermissible government subsidy
that materially injures a US industry. 27 Investigation proceedings into
subsidies are triggered either by an interested party within the United
States filing a petition, 28 or on motion by the Secretary of Commerce
without a petition. 29 An interested party may be, among other things, a
domestic manufacturer, a union, or a trade association representing an
industry. 30
Before describing CVD law in more detail, Section II.A provides
necessary context by defining key terms, “regulatory subsidy,” “social
dumping,” and “trade injury,” and their relationships to one another in
the context of applying the CVD statute to Malaysian manufactured
electronics imported into the United States. International trade law

26. “The term ‘countervailing duty’ shall be understood to mean a special duty levied for
the purpose of off-setting any bounty or subsidy bestowed directly or indirectly upon the
manufacture, production or export of any merchandise[.]” Agreement on Interpretation &
Application of Articles VI, XVI & XXIII of the Agreement of Oct. 30, 1947, at n.4, As Rectified
by the Proces-verbal of Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 9619 (1980),
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/tokyoround/subsidiescode.pdf [https://perma.cc/WX22-U56N].
27. If the Department of Commerce] determines that the government of a country or
any public entity within the territory of a country is providing, directly or indirectly,
a countervailable subsidy with respect to the manufacture, production, or export of a
class or kind of merchandise imported, or sold (or likely to be sold) for importation,
into the United States . . .
(A) an industry in the United States—
(i) is materially injured, or
(ii) is threatened with material injury, or
(B) the establishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded,
by reason of imports of that merchandise or by reason of sales (or the likelihood of
sales) of that merchandise for importation, then there shall be imposed upon such
merchandise a countervailing duty, in addition to any other duty imposed, equal to
the amount of the net countervailable subsidy.
19 U.S.C. § 1671 (2012).
28. “(a) Initiation by administering authority. A countervailing duty investigation
shall be initiated whenever the administering authority determines, from information
available to it, that a formal investigation is warranted into the question of whether
the elements necessary for the imposition of a duty under section 19 USC. § 1671(a)
exist. (b) Initiation by petition.”
19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (2016); see also United States v. Roses Inc., 706 F.2d 1563 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
29. 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a) (2016).
30. 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (4), (9) (2016).
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prohibits subsidies designed to promote exports31 because free market
principles deem subsidies as damaging to the efficient function of
markets. 32 The term “regulatory subsidy” must be understood in
contrast to the subsidies trade law ordinarily involves. The term
“subsidy” generally refers to a government policy that lowers the costs
of production to a given industry by directly providing economic
support in the form of land, monetary support, materials, goods, or
services at a reduced rate; 33 whereas a “regulatory subsidy” refers to a
government policy that reduces the production cost to an industry by
lowering certain transaction costs, such as the cost of waste disposal by
allowing toxic dumping or the costs of transacting with third parties by
deregulating labor law. 34
“Social dumping” refers to the policies of exporting countries that
artificially lower production costs by depressing labor rights 35 to export
goods into importing countries that cannot compete with the exporter’s
low wage costs. 36 Free market principles allow exporters with naturally
occurring comparative wage advantages, such as lower labor costs due
to a low cost of living, to exploit such advantages. 37 Governments that
deregulate labor markets to stimulate their export industries with cost
relief subsidies, however, may be subject to penalties if the act of
deregulation causes a trade injury to the importing country’s domestic
industry. 38
The plain language of the CVD statute grants a plaintiff in the
United States a cause of action against an exporting country when the
31. Timothy Meyer, Free Trade, Fair Trade, and Selective Enforcement, 118 COLUM. L.
REV. 491, 511–12 (2018).
32. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 806 (AM. LAW INST.
1987). International trade law prohibits subsidies designed to promote exports because free
market principles view subsidies as damaging to the efficient function of markets. Richard B.
Freeman, International Labor Standards and World Trade: Friends or Foes?, in THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM: CHALLENGES AHEAD 87 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 1996).
33. Subsidy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
34. Id.
35. Elissa Alben, Note, GATT and the Fair Wage: A Historical Perspective on the LaborTrade Link, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1423 (2001); See generally Marc H. Klein, The Single
European Act and Social Dumping: A New Appeal for Multinational Collective Bargaining, 12
U. PA. J. INT’L L. 411 (1991).
36. Alben, supra note 35, at 1417.
37. See Lance Compa, International Labor Standards and Instruments of Recourse for
Working Women, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 151, 152 n.4 (1992).
38. See Diane P. Wood, “Unfair” Trade Injury: A Competition-Based Approach, 41
STAN. L. REV. 1153, 1167-68 (1989).
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country’s government gives a “financial contribution” 39 to an export
industry that provides an economic “benefit;” 40 where the subsidy is
“specific” 41 to exports; and where the subsidy causes, or threatens to
cause, a material injury to US domestic industry. 42 For Commerce to
impose a duty on goods imported into the US there must be evidence
of—
i.

an economic contribution to industry

ii.

that confers a benefit

iii. which is specific to the export industry (i.e., not generally
available), and
iv. causes a material injury to a party in the United States. 43

In the context of trade, “trade injuries” occur when a manufacturer
in the importing country is unable to compete with the cost of
production of imported goods without receiving a subsidy. 44 CVD law
provides a cause of action to those who have suffered a trade injury as
a result of imported products that receive subsidies. 45 Section II.B.
describes how the CVD statute operates.
39. A financial contribution may involve direct funding by a government or public
entity to a producer, or the indirect transfer of funds through a funding mechanism or
a private party. It includes:
(i) A direct transfer of funds (e.g., grants, loans, equity infusions) or the potential
direct transfer of funds or liabilities (e.g., loan guarantees);
(ii) Foregoing or not collecting revenue that is otherwise due (e.g., tax credits,
deductions from taxable income, import duties);
(iii) Providing goods or services for less than adequate remuneration, other than
general infrastructure;
(iv) Purchasing goods for more than adequate remuneration.
Enforcement and Compliance-Subsidy Allegation, INT’L TRADE ADMIN.,
https://enforcement.trade.gov/petitioncounseling/pcp-subsidy-allegation.html
[https://perma.cc/HA4L-9562].
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. A World Trade Organization (“WTO”) Global Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
(“GATT”) panel has confirmed that government taxation relief that targets export industries
constitutes an actionable subsidy. See John Jackson, The Jurisprudence of International Trade:
The DISC Case in GATT, 72 AM. J. INT’L L. 747 (1978); infra note 138. Countervailable
subsidies include programs that “forego . . . revenue that is otherwise due, such as granting tax
credits or deductions from taxable income[.]”. Id.
43. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (1930).
44. See Jackson, supra note 38.
45. All parties to the WTO GATT agreement have their own CVD law. See infra notes
135, 144, 146, 147, 151.
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B. How the CVD Statute Operates
Under the CVD statute, Congress has granted US industry
representative or manufacturers, among others, standing to file a
petition with Commerce and the International Trade Commission
(“ITC”). 46 A petition by a domestic plaintiff in the United States against
Malaysian exports must make a plea for relief against economic factors,
such as depressed wages. 47 Here, the US domestic plaintiff would
allege that the Government of Malaysia’s deregulation of migrant labor
subsidizes Malaysian manufactuters by fostering a system that
depresses wages and artificially lowers the costs of production. Once a
plaintiff simultaneously files a petition that satisfies the requirements
in sections 351.202 through 203 48 and alleges, for example, that
imported goods have received a subsidy prohibited by the SCM
Agreement, the CVD action is commenced. 49 After commencing a
CVD investigation, Commerce and the ITC begin their parallel
preliminary determinations and publish the results of the investigations
in the Federal Register 50—”[a] daily publication of . . . federal-agency
regulations of general applicability and legal effect[.]” 51
The ITC makes the preliminary determinations as to whether the
imported goods under review have caused or threaten to cause material
injury to US industry 52 and Commerce makes a preliminary
determination 53 as to whether the alleged subsidies received by the
imported goods listed in the plaintiff’s petition are export specific
subsidies. 54 “Material injury” or threat of material injury includes, for
example, depressed prices and is defined by Title Nineteen, Section
46. Under 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a), there must be a determination of industry support:
“(4)(A) . . . the administering authority shall determine that the petition has been filed by or on
behalf of the industry, if—(i)the domestic producers or workers who support the petition account
for at least 25 percent of the total production of the domestic like product . . . .”
47. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7).
48. See 19 C.F.R. §§ 351.202-03 (2013) (CVD petition requirements).
49. 19 C.F.R. §§ 206.2, 207.10 (2015).
50. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.205.
51. Federal Register, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
52. The USITC has limited discretion in terms of declining to investigate or rejecting
petitions from domestic industries that sufficiently allege material injury. Republic Steel Corp.
v. United States, 4 Ct. Int’l Trade 33 (1982).
53. See id. (stating the procedure for a preliminary determination); see also 19 C.F.R. §
351.205.
54. U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 33 Ct. Int’l Trade 1935 (2009), remanded 34 Ct.
Int’l Trade 1193 (2010), aff’d 425 F. App’x 900 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

2019]

COUNTERVAILING SOCIAL DUMPING

1593

1677(7) of the United States Code. 55 The material injury element
provides domestic industry in the United States with a cause of action
and standing to file a petition 56 and the CVD petition is treated similarly
to a plaintiff’s initial pleading in a civil action. 57
The ITC’s preliminary determination of a material injury inquiry
requires a finding of a “reasonable indication of material injury or
threat of material injury.” 58 The preliminary determination requires a
lower level of analysis than the standard applied in a final

55. (7) Material injury. (A) In general. The term ‘material injury’ means harm which
is not inconsequential, immaterial, or unimportant . . . In making determinations
under sections . . . [19 U.S.C. §§ 1671b(a), 1671d(b), 1673b(a), 1673d(b)], the
Commission, in each case—
(i) shall consider— . . .
(II) the effect of imports of that merchandise on prices in the United States for
domestic like products, and
(III) the impact of imports of such merchandise on domestic producers of domestic
like products, but only in the context of production operations within the United
States; and
(ii) may consider such other economic factors as are relevant to the determination
regarding whether there is material injury by reason of imports . . .
(F) Threat of material injury.
(i) In general. In determining whether an industry in the United States is threatened
with material injury by reason of imports (or sales for importation) of the subject
merchandise, the Commission shall consider, among other relevant economic
factors— . . .
(IV) whether imports of the subject merchandise are entering at prices that are likely
to have a significant depressing or suppressing effect on domestic prices, and are
likely to increase demand for further imports . . .
19 U.S.C. § 1677(7).
56. See ANDREAS LOWENFELD, PUBLIC CONTROLS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE 372-74
(2d ed. 1983); see also Peter Ehrenhaft, What the Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty
Provisions of the Trade Agreements Act [Can] [Will] [Should] Mean for US Trade Policy, 11
L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1361 (1979); CURRENT ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, App.
C (Patrick F. J. Macrory & Peter O. Suchman eds., 1982); Judith Hippler Bello & Alan F.
Holmer, The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984: Principal Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty
Provisions, 19 INT’L L. 639 (1985).
57. Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 4 Ct. Int’l Trade 33, 40 (1982) (“Even a rough
analogy is sufficient to indicate that petitions should not be dismissed except for notable
deficiencies.”). See H.R. Rep. No. 96-317 (1979); see also S. Rep. No. 96-249 (1979), as
reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 381.
58. 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(a); see Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 8 Ct. Int’l Trade 29,
31 (1984) (“the criterion for finding a reasonable indication of material injury should have been
simply whether all subsidized or allegedly subsidized products of the same type could exert a
combined effect on the domestic industry”).
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determination. 59 In addition to the requirement of “material injury,” a
CVD will be applied only if, upon final determination, the value of the
offending subsidy is found to exceed one percent of the total value of
the goods. 60
The “specificity” analysis for subsidies that are generally
available requires Commerce to use the best information obtainable to
engage in a sequential analysis to determine whether the subsidy is de
facto specific despite its seeming general availability. 61 De facto
specificity, as defined by Section 771(5A)(D)(iii) of the Tariff Act, 62 is
found if Commerce identifies any one of the following factors: “(I) the
actual recipients of the subsidy, whether considered on an enterprise or
industry basis, are limited in number; (II) an enterprise or industry is a
predominant user of the subsidy; (III) an enterprise or industry receives
a disproportionately large amount of the subsidy.” 63 Commerce may
conclude its analysis in the affirmative, without proceeding further in
the analysis, when any one of the above factors, analyzed sequentially,
is found. 64 If Commerce makes a preliminary determination that
Malaysia’s deregulation of the migrant labor market is a de facto export
subsidy, then the ITC will make their determination as to whether the
subsidy is, or threatens to be, a material domestic injury because of the
subsidized imports. 65 Section II.C. shows that Malaysian labor policy
satisfies the second factor in Commerce “specificity” analysis because
Malaysian exporters are the predominant employers of migrant labor
and therefore the “predominant user of the subsidy[.]” 66
59. See Armstrong Rubber Co. v. United States, 9 Ct. Int’l Trade. 403, 405 (1985) (finding
that USITC made an error in its preliminary determination which had the effect of turning a
preliminary determination into a final determination).
60. Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. United States, 29 Ct. Int’l Trade 276 (2005) (affirming
that Department of Commerce can make affirmative determination in original countervailing
duty investigation, and issue countervailing duty order, only if aggregate net countervailable
subsidy equals or exceeds one percent ad valorem).
61. 19 C.F.R. § 351.502 (2019).
62. INT’L TRADE ADMIN., IMPORT ADMIN. POL’Y BULL. NO. 10.1, Specificity of Subsidies
Provided to State-owned Enterprises (2010), https://enforcement.trade.gov/policy/PB-10.1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/22ZP-H8PA].
63. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A)(D)(iii) (2016).
64. See generally 19 U.S.C. § 1677 (the standard for determining whether a bounty or
grant under 19 U.S.C. § 1303 or subsidy under 19 U.S.C. § 1677 has been conferred focuses on
the effect of benefits provided to recipients rather than on nominal availability of benefits);
Cabot Corp. v. United States, 9 Ct. Int’l Trade 489 (1985).
65. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675 (2016).
66. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5A)(D)(iii) (2016).
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C. Social Dumping Policies Satisfy the Plain Language of the
CVD Statute
Malaysian exporters are the predominant employers of migrant
labor. While the CVD statute usually addresses subsidies in their
ordinary sense, 67 it is an open question whether the CVD statute applies
to Malaysian labor policies. To support the argument that the CVD
statute applies to Malaysian migrant labor policy, Sub-Parts 1 and 2.
show how Malaysia’s labor policy satisfies elements i, ii, and iii of a
CVD petition, and Sub-Part 3 demonstrates that Malaysian labor policy
satisfies element iv by causing an economic harm to manufacturing
laborers in the United States.
1. The Economic Benefit of Malaysian Labor Policy to its
Export Industry
Malaysian labor policy is a regulatory subsidy that provides an
economic benefit to its export manufacturing industry by deregulating
migrant labor policies to allow for an increased supply of migrant labor
as well as shifting cost burdens away from the manufacturers and onto
the migrant workers. 68 The economic growth related to the Malaysian
electronics industry 69 is linked to a regulatory environment that
diminishes the welfare of workers in Malaysia 70 and abroad. 71 With a
gross domestic product (“GDP”) of US$314 billion in 2017 72 and the
67. See generally 19 U.S.C. § 1671a (2016).
68. Supra Section II.C.
69. The electronics industry, which is primarily export based, made up 36.7% of
Malaysia’s total export value in 2017. Electrical and Electronics, MALAYSIAN INT’L DEV.
AUTH., http://www.mida.gov.my/home/electrical-and-electronic/posts/ [ https://perma.cc/
E4WE-BSWF].
70. Malaysia – Peninsular Malaysia and Sarawak, Individual Case (CAS) - Discussion:
2018, on its 107th Session, INT’L LABOR ORG. (2018), https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/
en/f?p=1000:13101:0::NO:13101:P13101_COMMENT_ID:3330953:YES [https://perma.cc/
PB3G-3SLV]; see also Ragayah Haji Mat Zin, Malaysia: Towards a Social Protection System
in an Advanced Equitable Society, 29 ASEAN ECON. BULL. 197 (2012).
71. See generally INT’L TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION, INTERNATIONALLY
RECOGNISED CORE LABOUR STANDARDS IN MALAYSIA: REPORT FOR THE WTO GENERAL
COUNCIL REVIEW (2010); AMNESTY INT’L, TRAPPED: THE EXPLOITATION OF MIGRANT
WORKERS IN MALAYSIA (2010); SARAH BORMANN ET AL., MIGRATION IN A DIGITAL AGE:
MIGRANT WORKERS IN THE MALAYSIAN ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY: A CASE STUDY ON JABIL
CIRCUIT AND FLEXTRONICS (2010), http://electronicswatch.org/migration-in-a-digitalage_3542.pdf [https://perma.cc/43EK-5JCF].
72. Malaysia GDP, 2017, WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.
GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=MY [https://perma.cc/9HSQ-2NJD].
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total volume of exports at US$217 billion in the same year, 73 the export
industry makes up almost two-thirds of Malaysia’s GDP. 74 Malaysia’s
current status as an export manufacturing economy grew out of a series
of policies started in the 1990s that focused on Malaysia achieving
“developed nation” status by the year 2020. 75 The Government of
Malaysia enacted economic transformation policies through a
succession of five-year plans that targeted the global export market to
make manufacturing more dominant than agriculture. 76 Labor
shortages presented a challenge to Malaysia’s sixth five-year economic
development plan spanning from 1991 to 1996, which emphasized
macroeconomic growth through policies focusing on industrialization,
manufacturing, and trade. 77
Malaysia’s export industry, which has strong representation from
electronics and electrical (“E&E”) manufacturers, 78 started lobbying
the Government of Malaysia to loosen the restrictions on migrant labor
in the 1980s. 79 In the early 1990s, the Malaysian government responded
73. Export of Goods from Malaysia 2017: STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/
319008/export-of-goods-to-malaysia/ [https://perma.cc/PF2P-Y8GY].
74. Id. Malaysia’s 2017 GDP was US$314 billion. Malaysia’s 2017 revenue from exports
was US$217 billion. Id.
75. Malaysian Economic Growth and Foreign Workers, 3 MIGRATION NEWS (Sept.
1996), https://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=1039 [https://perma.cc/WEE5-X5UP].
76. See Cassey Lee & Lee Chew-Ging, The Evolution of Development Planning in
Malaysia, 34 J. SE. ASIAN ECON. 438, 438-40 (2017).
77. See id.; see also Vijayakumari Kanapathy, Controlling Irregular Migration: The
Malaysian Experience (ILO Asian Reg’l Programme on Governance of Labour Migration,
Working Paper No. 14, 2008), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-asia/—-robangkok/documents/publication/wcms_160587.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GZ9-QP8Z]; Amarjit
Kaur, Managing Labour Migration in Malaysia: Guest Worker Programs and the
Regularisation of Irregular Labour Migrants as a Policy Instrument, 38 ASIAN STUD. REV. 345
(2014).
78. Electrical and Electronics Industry in Malaysia, FACTS & DETAILS,
http://factsanddetails.com/southeast-asia/Malaysia/sub5_4e/entry-3697.html [https://perma.cc/
ZN8Q-3U2N].
Malaysia is a major electronics producer and exporter. The electrical & electronics
(E&E) industry is the leading sector in Malaysia’s manufacturing sector, contributing
significantly to the country’s manufacturing output (26.94 percent), exports (48.7
percent) and employment (32.5 percent). In 2010, the gross output of the industry
totaled [US]$50.94 billion, exports amounted to [US]$75.7 billion and created
employment opportunities for 325,696 people. The major export destinations are
USA, China and Singapore while the major import destinations are Taiwan, USA and
South Korea.
Id.
79. Mohamed Ariff, The Malaysian Economic Experience and its Relevance for the OIC
Member Countries, 6 ISLAMIC ECON. STUD. 1, 11 (Nov. 1998); (“[In Malaysia, in the mid-
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to the influence of the manufacturing industry and changed its migrant
worker policy. 80 The changes in policy preceded consistent economic
gains spurred by a boost in international trade. 81
Malaysia is a historically agricultural country with fewer than
nine million domestic laborers, and the government’s shift in economic
policy to focus on labor-intensive export manufacturing required a plan
to increase the supply of labor. 82 The Government of Malaysia
addressed the labor shortages by increasing the influx of labor with the
guest worker program—a government-run initiative launched in
response to demands from the Malaysian manufacturers who had
1980’s] [t]ariffs were reduced primarily to make imports cheaper and foreign workers were
brought in large numbers to keep wages low.”); Liz Gooch, Foreign Employees Limited,
Malaysia Is Suffering Through a Labor Shortage, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/01/business/economy/01labor.html [https://perma.cc/VJF5QMJ8].
Mohamed Ariff, executive director of the Malaysian Institute of Economic Research,
said the country’s dependence on foreign labor was a result of a decision to “open the
floodgates” to migrant workers in the late 1980s . . . then in manufacturing. Mr. Ariff
said that in the early 1990s, when wages in the manufacturing sector were rising,
factories had considered introducing labor-saving technology but that many had
shelved those plans when the government let them employ more foreign workers.
Id.
In 1995, an explicit policy on the import of migrant labour was announced when the
manufacturing sector, which was then the main engine of (export) growth, was also
hit by labour shortage and had to hire contract migrant workers. In the 1995/96 annual
national budget, the state sanctioned the import of migrant workers as an interim
solution to meet excess demand for low-skilled labour while it pursued a longer-term
strategy to increase productivity and expand the supply of skilled labour . . . This was
an open acknowledgment that migrant labour played a vital role in supporting the
dynamism of key sectors in the country. Malaysia’s heavy reliance on foreign direct
investment to drive export growth and to provide employment to local urban jobseekers meant that it could not risk an abrupt uprooting of footloose foreign firms
until it could build up its domestic capabilities to drive growth. And during the
economic upturn, foreign workers played a vital role in the macro-economic
management of the economy.
Kanapathy, supra note 77, at 355, tbl. 2
81. Zainal Aznam Yusof & Deepak Bhattasali, Economic Growth and Development in
Malaysia: Policy Making and Leadership 27-29 (WORLD BANK COMM’N ON GROWTH & DEV.,
Working Paper No. 27, 2008), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPREMNET/Resources/
489960-1338997241035/Growth_Commission_Working_Paper_27_Economic_Growth_
Development_Malaysia_Policy_Making_Leadership.pdf [https://perma.cc/27JU-AVUN].
82. See generally Kaur, supra note 77.
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previously been unable to expand because of labor shortages. 83 In
1991, the government launched the Comprehensive Policy on the
Recruitment of Migrant Labor, 84 which created a “Special Task Force
on Foreign Labour” that approved migrant visa requests from exportoriented industries and focused on migration policies designed to
promote Malaysia’s export economy. 85 The government’s migrant
policy favors the export industry by placing fewer eligibility
requirements on export manufacturers that make applications for work
visas than domestic industry. 86
In the year 2000, documented foreign labor made up twenty
percent of Malaysia’s workforce of nine million laborers. 87 Malaysia’s
trend of positive year over year five percent economic growth since the
economic crash in 1998 up until 2018 positively correlates with the
growth in migrant labor work permits and the number of migrant visas
issued by the Government of Malaysia has doubled over twenty
years. 88 Malaysia’s labor-intensive export manufacturing industry

83. See generally Kaur, supra note 77.
84. Kanapathy, supra note 77.
85. See Kaur, supra note 77, at 354.
[i]n late 1994 the government formed a Special Task Force on Foreign Labour to
handle/process foreign labour applications. This Task Force was intended to be a onestop agency and it took over the task of processing foreign labour approvals from the
Immigration Department. . . . The Immigration Department’s role was also expanded
to include management of foreign labour recruitment; the identification of
“appropriate” labour-source countries; and determination of eligibility of
sectors/firms requiring foreign workers. Four sectors – agriculture, manufacturing,
services and construction – were considered eligible for foreign worker employment,
based on their contribution to the export-oriented component of the Malaysian . .
economy . . . .
Kaur, supra note 77, at 354.
86. Kaur, supra note 77, at 355 tbl.2.
87. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL LABOR AFFAIRS AND U.S.
EMBASSY, KUALA LUMPUR, FLT 02-10, FOREIGN LABOR TRENDS: MALAYSIA 5 (2002),
https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1105&context=key_workpl
ace [https://perma.cc/FTU2-SPK2].
88. See LEE HWOK-AUN & KHOR YU LENG, COUNTING MIGRANT WORKERS IN
MALAYSIA: A NEEDLESSLY PERSISTING CONUNDRUM 1, 4 fig. 1 (2018),
https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS_Perspective_2018_25@50.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P8GT-FYSA]. In the year 2000, Malaysia counted 800,000 foreign work
permit holders and employed persons. In 2016, that number grew to 2,100,000.
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employs the largest ratio of migrant workers. 89 The Malaysian national
ratio for domestic-to-foreign labor is five-to-one on average; while on
Borneo Island, in Sarawak province, in towns such as Mukah, Bintulu,
Selangau, Sibuti, and Senadin, the percentage range of foreign laborers
is up to forty percent. 90 The reliance on migrant labor is more extreme
in export-focused regions along the trade corridor, such as the
Kinabatangan district on Borneo Island, where foreign labor comprises
sixty percent of the workforce. 91
2. Policies that Favor Manufacturers and that Fail to Protect
Migrant Workers
While the Government of Malaysia has shown a commitment to
growing its economy, 92 there is lack of commitment to protecting
migrant workers. 93 Malaysia has the worst possible ranking status for
human trafficking violations 94 with a large amount of trafficked labor
being to the benefit of the export-focused electronics industry fueling

89. Id. at 7, tbl. 1; Jacob A. Jordaan, Foreign Workers and Productivity in an Emerging
Economy: The Case of Malaysia, 22 REV. DEV. ECON. 148, 164 (2017) (“A comparison of the
estimated effects of foreign workers across these various sets of industries indicates that, at least
for the Malaysian case, positive productivity effects from the use of (low skilled) foreign
workers are particularly pronounced in export oriented modern industries, characterized by
assembly-intensive production processes.”).
90. Hwok-Aun & Leng, supra note 88, at 6 fig. 2.
91. Hwok-Aun & Leng, supra note 88, at 6 fig. 2.
92. Why Malaysia, supra note 20.
93. Individual Case (CAS) – Discussion: 2014, Publication: 103rd ILC session –
Malaysia,
INT’L
LABOUR
ORG.,
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=
1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID:3175038 [https://perma.cc/66RF-EJRA].
The Worker member of the Philippines expressed the view that the situation of
migrant workers [in Malaysia] had not improved . . . and required more appropriate
and bold actions and initiatives. He indicated that Malaysia was a country of
destination and, to a lesser extent, a source and transit country for trafficking in
persons. The majority of trafficking victims voluntarily immigrated to Malaysia in
search of a better life, and while many offenders were individual business people,
large organized crime syndicates with connections to high government officials were
also involved.
Id.
94. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE TO MONITOR AND COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS,
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 260 (2014), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
226847.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XE5-3E48].
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the country’s economic growth. 95 The living conditions of migrant
workers in Malaysia has drawn the attention of the United States
Department of Labor, which identifies the root cause of the precarious
way of life endemic to migrant workers in Malaysia as a gap between
the Government of Malaysia’s existing laws and the Government of
Malaysia’s lack of enforcement 96 of those laws. 97
The Government of Malaysia’s migrant labor policies place
financial burdens on vulnerable migrant communities that lead to
migrant indebtedness and forced labor. 98 One prominent example of
the Malaysian government enacting policies that burden migrants and
benefit manufacturers can be traced to the year 1991, when the
government enacted an annual per-capita flat tax on migrant workers
(“Foreign Worker Tax”). 99 The Foreign Worker Tax was originally
intended to discourage employer reliance on foreign workers by
95. Ariel Ramchandani, Forced Labor Is the Backbone of the World’s Electronics
Industry, THE ATLANTIC (June 28, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2018/
06/malaysia-forced-labor-electronics/563873/ [https://perma.cc/ML2P-VWTK].
96. Evelyn Shyamala Devadason & Chan Wai Meng, Policies and Laws Regulating
Migrant Workers in Malaysia: A Critical Appraisal, 44 J. CONTEMP. ASIA 19 (2014),
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/00472336.2013.826420
[https://perma.cc/28QR-N3YJ].
97. The US Department of Labor identifies Malaysia’s treatment of migrant workers as a
problem area and has allocated US$70,000 to advocacy programs for workers’ rights between
2015 and 2019. An Independent Multi-Project Evaluation of Protecting the Rights of Migrant
Workers Through Empowerment and Advocacy in Malaysia and Support for Labor Law and
Industrial Relations Reform in Malaysia (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/
protecting-rights-migrant-workers-through-empowerment-and-advocacy-malaysia
[https://perma.cc/7QN4-PMZM].
98. PIYASIRI WICKRAMASEKARA, INT’L LABOUR ORG., BILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND
MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING ON MIGRATION OF LOW-SKILLED WORKERS: A REVIEW 26
(2015),
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---migrant/
documents/publication/wcms_413810.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CS7-WLGG].
There is increasing attention on recruitment costs as a major cause of poor governance
and protection gaps in labour migration (citation omitted). High . . . recruitment fees
lead to high debt burdens and erode savings and remittances, and thus erode benefits
from migration, for both origin and destination countries and migrants themselves.
Id.
See generally DIRECTOR-GENERAL, INT’L LABOUR ORG., A GLOBAL ALLIANCE AGAINST
FORCED LABOUR (2005), https://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc93/pdf/rep-ib.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VM4-9USP].
99. ILO REGIONAL OFFICE FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, REVIEW OF LABOUR MIGRATION
POLICY IN MALAYSIA 19 (2016), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-asia/—-robangkok/documents/publication/wcms_447687.pdf [https://perma.cc/SS8X-FARL].
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making the tax payable by employers. 100 However, employer groups
successfully lobbied the government to shift the burden of paying the
Foreign Worker Tax from employers to employees. 101 The tax raises
significant revenue—close to half a billion in US dollars annually in
2012—with no guarantee of services or benefits to the taxed migrant
population; 102 while MIDA promises foreign investors responsive
governance and a “continuous” supply of “productive” and
“harmonious” 103 workers in return for a tax that the employers do not
pay. 104
Despite taxing migrants, the Government of Malaysia does not
deal with migrant laborers directly and migrants are largely managed
by a system of agencies that charge unregulated fees for their
services. 105 The intermediaries that charge fees to migrant workers are
linked to both human-trafficking syndicates and Malaysian
government officials. 106 The financial vulnerability of migrants is made
worse by the burden of paying for additional employment-related
services that can cost over Malay.RM2,000 (ringgits) per year107—
approximately two months’ salary for the lowest paid worker. 108 The
100. Id.
101. Id.
The Malaysian Government has imposed an annual levy on employment of foreign
workers since 1992. Initially, it was payable by migrant workers but was shifted to
employers in 2009 to encourage economic restructuring. In 2013, employers were
granted permission to transfer the levy back to workers. The justification provided
was that it would not represent a significant financial burden for migrants given the
salary increase they would receive of between 30-50 per cent under the Minimum
Wage Order.
Id.
102. See Ramchandani, supra note 95.
103. See Why Malaysia, supra note 20.
104. See Why Malaysia, supra note 20.
105. Kaur, supra note 77, at 361.
106. See Individual Case (CAS), supra note 93.
107. See ILO REGIONAL OFFICE FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, supra note 99, at 21 n.6.
The levy is just one of the eight government fees applied to employment of migrant
workers: (1) Levy: MYR 410 - 1,850 (determined by sector); (2) Visit pass: MYR 60;
(3) Visa: MYR 15 - 100 (determined by nationality); (4) Processing fee: MYR 125;
(5) Security bond: MYR 250 - 1,500 (determined by nationality); (6) Foreign Worker
Compensation Scheme: MYR 86 + 5 per cent service charge; (7) Health insurance
premium: MYR120; and (8) Medical examination: MYR 180 – 190 (determined by
gender).
See ILO REGIONAL OFFICE FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, supra note 99, at 21 n.6. (citing
2014 Malaysian Ministry of Home Affairs data).
108. See ILO REGIONAL OFFICE FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, supra note 99, at 21 n.6.
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regulatory environment that imposes high costs on migrants often
results in workers being forced into debt before they even enter the
country. 109
3. Material Injury to US Manufacturing Laborers
Malaysian labor policy, coupled together with Malaysia’s
dominance in export manufacturing, means that manufacturing
laborers in the United States compete with the Malaysian labor force.
The net result of this competition has been that many laborers in the
US manufacturing industry have experienced stagnant wages or job
losses. 110 Malaysian export manufacturers recruit substantial numbers
of migrants and save employment costs on hiring migrants because of
a regulatory environment that keeps migrants in a politically,
physically, and economically vulnerable position, thereby contributing
to lower labor costs. 111 Since 2000, the closure of more than 78,000
manufacturing sites in the United States, 112 has led to a twenty-eight
percent decline in US manufacturing employment. 113
Malaysia’s labor policy presents a problem to the international
labor market that the current regulatory framework does not address.
109. 2017 Trafficking in Persons Report - Malaysia, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (June 27,
2017), http://www.refworld.org/docid/5959ec93a.html [https://perma.cc/T6GQ-YN5L]
[M]igrants are subjected to forced labor or debt bondage by their employers,
employment agents, or informal labor recruiters when they are unable to pay the fees
for recruitment and associated travel. Foreign workers employed by outsourcing or
contract labor companies, which may or may not have oversight of personnel issues
or day-to-day working conditions, have heightened vulnerabilities to exploitative
labor conditions and a reduced ability to resolve disputes. Agents in labor source
countries may impose onerous fees on workers before they arrive in Malaysia, in
some cases causing debt bondage. Foreign workers in Malaysia and the companies
that employ them are subject to a complex system of government fees for immigration
processing, foreign worker levies, and other administrative processes. The law allows
many of the fees, which are initially paid by employers, to be deducted from workers’
wages, incentivizing employers to prevent workers from ending their employment
before fees are recouped.
Id.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Houseman, supra note 8, at 20.
See supra Section II.C.2.
Houseman, supra note 8, at 5.
Guildford, supra note 9; Leo Gerard, Who is Killing American Manufacturing?,
INDUSTRY WEEK (Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.industryweek.com/who-is-killingmanufacturing [https://perma.cc/4S82-U5FM].
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Part II explained the link between trade law, Malaysian economic
growth, the poor social conditions experienced by migrant laborers in
Malaysia, and the economic hardship of manufacturing laborers in the
United States. While Part II only hinted at the proposition that trade
law may be a viable solution to the problems created by Malaysia’s
migrant labor policy, Part III presents a deeper analysis of the viability
of that solution.
III. TRADE LAW AS A SOLUTION TO ECONOMIC
EXPLOITATION
Application of the CVD statute to the type of regulatory subsidies
described in Part II would provide an economic disincentive to
governments that seek to deregulate labor policy to achieve economic
growth. Therefore, the CVD statute may address the problem of the
regulatory gap in international labor regulation that allows the
Malaysian government to exploit migrant workers by disincentivizing
profit driven labor market deregulation. 114 The proposed solution begs
the question of whether “regulatory subsidies” 115 fall within the scope
of the CVD statute. If a CVD petition alleges a regulatory subsidy,
Commerce would make the preliminary determination as to whether
such a subsidy falls within the meaning of the statute. As discussed in
Part II, there are four elements that need to be alleged in a plaintiff’s
CVD petition for Commerce to begin its investigation and preliminary
determinations into alleged government subsidies: i) a contribution
from the government, ii) that confers an economic benefit to industry,
iii) and is not generally available, but is specific to the export industry,
and iv) causes a material injury to a party in the United States.116 While
Part II provided an illustration of how Malaysian migrant labor policy
arguably satisfied the elements of a CVD petition, Part III presents an
analysis of a threshold issue: whether regulatory subsidies fall within
the scope of the CVD statute.

114. See supra Section II.C.2.
115. Trachtman, supra note 24, at 92.
116. See supra note 43.
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A. The Meaning of Subsidy
The policies and processes for investigating subsidies are well
defined but the meaning of the word “subsidy” is not. 117 Although the
remedy of CVD is statutory, the definition of subsidy has been subject
to common law development. 118 The remedy of CVD has existed in US
trade law for over a century: first in 1897, in Title 19, Section 1303 of
the United States Code, which allowed the Secretary of the Treasury to
place duties on imported goods benefitting from any “bounty or
grant.” 119 The CVD remedy to trade injuries is also in Section 753 of
the Tariff Act of 1930, codified and incorporated into Title 19, Section
1671 of the United States Code after the passage of the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979 120 and later amended by the Trade and Tariff
Act of 1984. 121 Section 1303, repealed in 1994, 122 existed for some
time alongside Section 1671, and applied only to countries not a party
to the relevant international agreements; while Section 1671 applied,
and continues to apply, to countries that are party to the international
agreement on subsidies and countervailing measures (“SCM
Agreement”). 123
Before there were legislative attempts to define actionable
subsidies, such as the 1979 Subsidies Code Annex, 124 the definition of

117. William Lay, Redefining Actionable “Subsidies” Under U.S. Countervailing Duty
Law, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1495 (1991).
118 See Alan O. Sykes, Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic Perspective, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 199 (1989); Charles J. Goetz et al., The Meaning of “Subsidy” and “Injury” in the
Countervailing Duty Law, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 17–32 (1986).
119. Trachtman, supra note 24, at 92.
120. Pub. L. No. 96-39, U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE, https://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-93/pdf/STATUTE-93-Pg144.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZAN7-QNZ6].
121. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 806, supra note 32.
122. 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (repealed. Pub. L. No. 103–465, title II, § 261(a), Dec. 8, 1994, 108
Stat. 4908).
123. See Cabot Corp. v. United States, 12 Ct. Int’l Trade 664, 671-72 (1988); see also
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14, Annex
1A, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, https://www.wto.org/english/
docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf [https://perma.cc/5925-DL8G] [hereinafter SCM Agreement].
124. Agreement on Interpretation & Application of Articles VI, XVI & XXIII of the
Agreement of Oct. 30, 1947, As Rectified by the Procesverbal of Dec. 17, 1979., T.I.A.S. No.
9619 (1980), http://www.worldtradelaw.net/tokyoround/subsidiescode.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9C93-HL34] [hereinafter Subsidies Code]; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW § 806, supra note 32.
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an actionable subsidy—or “bounty or grant” 125—developed in the
United States through the common law. 126 The definition continues to
develop through the common law, where, for example, in 1985, after
the SCM Agreement, in Cabot Corp. v. United States, 127 the Court of
International Trade held that the term “bounty or grant” in Title
Nineteen, Section 1303 of the United States Code has the same
meaning as the term “subsidy” in the CVD statute. 128
1. Specific Export Subsidies
CVD investigations deal with two types of subsidy: actionable
subsidies and non-actionable subsidies. There are two types of
actionable subsidy: a de jure export subsidy (such as a direct economic
subsidy to the export industry referred to in Section II.A and de facto
“specific” subsidies to the export industry, as described in Cabot).129
Generally available subsidies are not countervailable because they are
not “specific” to the export industry, as required by Title 19, Section
1677(5A). 130 In Cabot, a reviewing court affirmed Commerce’s
determination that the “general availability” of a subsidy in theory did
not defeat a finding of a subsidy when the subsidy was mainly used, in
practice, by export manufacturers. 131 Similarly, even though domestic
manufacturers in Malaysia may, in theory, apply for an allocation of
guest worker visas—the data show that Malaysia is an export economy,
that migrant policy concentrates migrant labor in export manufacturing
areas, and that export manufacturers are the largest beneficiaries of
Malaysia’s guest worker program. 132 Therefore, as in Cabot, a CVD
125. A subsidy is the same as a “bounty or grant,” it is a benefit conferred upon “a specific
enterprise or industry or group of enterprises or industries.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5).
126. See, e.g., Downs v. United States, 187 U.S. 496 (1903) (holding that a “bounty” was
given by Russia to sugar exporters in the form of a saleable certificate of freedom from excise
taxes); see also Nicholas & Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 34 (1919) (affirming that the
determination that England’s allowance against excise taxes on liquor exports was a
countervailable “bounty”).
127. Cabot Corp. v. United States, 9 Ct. Int’l Trade 489 (1985); Trachtman, supra note 24,
at 92.
128. See Cabot Corp., 9 Ct. Int’l Trade, at 494-95. The holding in Cabot has been codified
within the definitions of “countervailable subsidy.” See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5); Trachtman, supra
note 24, at 92.
129. See Trachtman, supra note 24.
130. See Trachtman, supra note 24.
131. See Trachtman, supra note 24.
132. See supra Section II.C.2.
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petition can potentially claim that if the Government of Malaysia’s
migrant policies are subsidies, then they are export specific subsidies
subject to a CVD order.
A successful CVD petition results in Commerce imposing a tariff
on a specific imported good that has received an “actionable subsidy”
from an exporting country. 133 The question of what counts as an
actionable subsidy has no clear answer and investigations turn on direct
and circumstantial evidence. 134 The application of a CVD to an
exporting country’s goods is subject to review by the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”), 135 and such orders against non-actionable
subsidies may be challenged and referred to the dispute settlement
process at the WTO. 136 In the United States, final determinations on
CVD petitions by Commerce and the ITC (either to apply or to not
apply CVD) are also subject to domestic judicial review under Title
Nineteen, Section 1516 of the United States Code. 137
The applicable definitions of a “countervailable subsidy” to CVD
orders issued under the CVD statute are in Title 19, Section 1677(5)
(“CVD Definitions”). 138 The CVD Definitions include government
133. See Kelly Phillips Erb, As Trump Talks Tariffs, Here’s What You Need To Know,
FORBES (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2018/03/01/as-trumptalks-tariffs-heres-what-you-need-to-know/#200189d4195a [https://perma.cc/Y4DB-S928].
134. See American Spring Wire Corp. v. United States, 8 Ct. Int’l Trade 20, 25-26 (1984)
(quoting SCM Corp. v. United States, 4 Ct. Int’l Trade 7, 13 (1982)); 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a).
135. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM Agreement”), WORLD
TRADE
ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/6J2B-HTSM].
136. A unique contribution, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm [https://perma.cc/CV9H-Z563].
137. See Mannesmann-Sumerbank Boru Endustrisi T.A.S. v. United States, 23 Ct. Int’l
Trade 1052 (1999) (CIT reviews and remands a CVD order on welded carbon steel line pipe,
tubes, and pipes from Turkey to the extent of Commerce’s calculation of importers’ ad valorem
subsidy rate in determining countervailing duty rate, because it deviated from prior practice).
138. 1677(5)—Countervailable subsidy.
(A) In general.
Except as provided in paragraph (5B), a countervailable subsidy is a subsidy
described in this paragraph which is specific as described in paragraph (5A)
(B) Subsidy described. A subsidy is described in this paragraph in the case in which
an authority
(i) provides a financial contribution . . .
(D) Financial contribution. The term “financial contribution” means . . .
ii) foregoing or not collecting revenue that is otherwise due, such as granting tax
credits or deductions from taxable income,
(iii) providing goods or services, other than general infrastructure . . . .
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programs that act as a financial contribution or “price support”—within
the meaning of Article XVI of the GATT 1994—to an exporting
industry. 139 Examples of financial contributions to industry in Article
XVI that apply to the Malaysian policies described in Part II include
government actions to exempt export-focused industries from certain
regulatory costs, such as the Foreign Worker Tax, 140 otherwise payable
by the domestic industry. 141
The definitions of subsidies that are subject to sanction under
CVD law within the international framework are equally open-ended.
While the SCM Agreement allows CVDs as a remedy for subsidies,
and the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code Agreement (“Subsidies
Code”) 142 provides guidance on the interpretation and application of
CVD, both agreements remain deliberately vague 143 as to the definition
of the term “subsidy.” 144 Neither the SCM Agreement nor the Subsidies
Code requires countries implementing CVD remedies into their
domestic code 145 to provide statutory definitions of the term
“subsidy.” 146 The Subsidies Code does, however, provide a nonexhaustive list 147 of potential examples of subsidies within the Annex
A or the SCM Agreement. 148 Malaysia’s policy of making the Foreign
19 U.S.C. § 1677(5).
139. See generally Article XVI-Subsidies, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/
english/res_e/publications_e/ai17_e/gatt1994_art16_gatt47.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U6MAF9HG].
140. See supra Part II.
141. See supra Part II.
142. See Subsidies Code, supra note 124, at 4.
143. See William K. Wilcox, GATT-Based Protectionism and the Definition of a Subsidy
16 B.U. INT’L L.J. 129, 137 n.53, 163 (1998).
144. Lay, supra note 117, at 1496.
145. Malaysian CVD law provides that:
43. (1) When no applicable international obligation on countervailing and antidumping duties exist between Malaysia and the interested foreign government—
(a) countervailing and anti-dumping duties may be imposed without regard to
an investigation referred to in sections 4 and 20; and (b) the Government shall
be entitled to use any administrative and legal definition, methodology and
procedure it deems appropriate, with regard to the investigations.
Laws Malaysia, Act 504, Countervailing and Antidumping Duties Act 1993,
http://www.miti.gov.my/miti/resources/fileupload/Countervailing_and_AntiDumping_Duties_Act_1993_[Act_504].pdf [https://perma.cc/2VLV-KGLJ].
146. Lay, supra note 117, at 1496.
147. Wilcox, supra note 143, at 137.
148. (a) The provision by governments of direct subsidies to a firm or an industry
contingent upon export performance . . .
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Worker Tax payable by employees rather than employers 149 fits
example (e) in Annex A: “(e) The full or partial exemption, remission,
or deferral specifically related to exports, of direct taxes 150 or social
welfare charges paid or payable by industrial or commercial
enterprises.” (“Annex (e)”) The Court of International Trade has
affirmed that the definitions in the Annex fall within the scope of
Commerce’s definition of a subsidy under Section 1677(5)(A).151
Therefore, there is legal merit to the claim that, under the CVD Statute,
Malaysian exports should be subject to countervailing duties designed
to offset the benefit received from Malaysia’s migrant policy of shifting
cost burdens from manufacturers onto migrants. 152
Part II explains the proposition that Malaysia’s migrant labor
policy, to the extent that the policy provides a benefit to manufacturers
in Malaysia and causes traceable harm to persons in the United States,
is a subsidy within the meaning of the CVD Statute. Part III
demonstrates the process that Commerce undertakes in assessing CVD
petitions that allege such subsidies. If Commerce either accepts or
rejects a petition alleging a regulatory subsidy, parties to the decision
may appeal the decision, and Title Nineteen, Section 1516 of the United
(e) The full or partial exemption, remission, or deferral specifically related to exports,
of direct taxes or social welfare charges paid or payable by industrial or commercial
enterprises . . .
(l) Any other charge on the public account constituting an export subsidy in the
sense of Article XVI of the General Agreement.
See Subsidies Code supra note 124, at 17-18.
149. See supra Section II.C.3.
150. “The term ‘direct taxes’ shall mean taxes on wages, profits, interest, rents, royalties,
and all other forms of income, and taxes on the ownership of real property.” See Subsidies Code,
supra note 124, at 17 n.1.
151. Can-Am Corp. v. United States, 11 Ct. Int’l Trade 424, 430 (1987).
Commerce asserts that in order to be an export bounty, grant or subsidy within the
meaning of the countervailing duty statutes the benefit bestowed must be linked to
the exportation of the goods. The Court finds this interpretation of section 1677(5)(A)
“export” subsidies to be consistent with the types of subsidies described in Annex A
to the Agreement. The Court also finds the requirements that the alleged benefit be
contingent upon export performance or that it stimulate export sales over domestic
sales to be consistent with the other forms of export subsidies in Annex A, and holds
that such requirements are reasonable criteria for determining whether the benefit
bestowed is sufficiently tied to the exportation of the goods.
Id.
152. See supra Section II.C.3.
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States Code provides that the Court of International Trade has
jurisdiction over such reviews of Commerce’s decisions. 153 If
Commerce rejected the application of the CVD Statute to regulatory
subsidies, a domestic plaintiff would have a right to file an appeal of
the rejection with the Court of International Trade. 154 Similarly, if
Commerce accepted the applicability of the CVD statute to exported
goods from Malaysia that have benefited from Malaysia’s migrant
labor policy, the government of Malaysia would be likely to appeal the
decision. 155 As a decision by Commerce to either accept or reject a
petition against a regulatory subsidy may result in an appeal for judicial
review, Part III discusses the broader implications of applying the CVD
statute to regulatory subsidies. While Parts II and III described a gap in
the regulation of international labor standards, Part IV explains the gap
in more detail before Part V concludes that if trade law can bridge the
gap, then the ends would justify the means.
IV. BRIDGING THE GAP IN INTERNATIONAL LABOR
REGULATION
The CVD statute is an enforcement instrument designed to
discourage foreign subsidies that cause injury to the markets of
importing countries. 156 Part II showed that when a government like
Malaysia’s proves immune to exhortation and censure, international
labor standards are jeopardized. Part II explains that CVD laws are
often used by domestic industry in the United States against foreign
importers perceived to be violating free trade principles. 157 Part III
addresses the necessity of using trade law remedies to discipline poor
labor standards in Malaysia. 158
153. See supra note 137, and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 137, and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 137, and accompanying text.
156. See Robert H. Lantz, The Search for Consistency: Treatment of Nonmarket
Economics in Transition Under United States Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws, 10
AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 993, 1009, 1009-15 (1995) (outlining the purposive theories of CVD
laws in the context of importing countries and economic impact).
157. There have been over 600 Antidumping and Countervailing Duty investigations
initiated against importers into the United States since January 1, 2000. INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY
INVESTIGATIONS INITIATED AFTER JANUARY 01, 2000 (2016), https://enforcement.trade.gov/
stats/inv-initiations-2000-current.html [https://perma.cc/92MJ-Q748].
158. See supra Part III.
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The common law development of the CVD definition of
“subsidy” described in Section III.A suggests that although
“regulatory” subsidies have not been a part of CVD actions by
Commerce until now, it is possible for policies that deregulate labor
markets to fall within the scope of the CVD statute by means of judicial
interpretation rather than through statutory amendment. The
International Labour Organisation (“ILO”), which is instrumental in
defining, promoting, and promulgating international labor standards,
only has enforcement powers limited to “exhortation and censure,”159
which means that, in the absence of enforceable international labor
standards, 160 there are few means available to prevent countries like
Malaysia from exploiting migrant labor for economic benefit.161
Despite a lack of global enforcement, the situation in Malaysia, where
the government acts with impunity, is increasingly anomalous in the
current climate of international labor regulation because—since the
mid-1990s—free trade agreements increasingly include labor rights
protections. 162
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”), a free trade agreement to
which Malaysia and the United States were both negotiating parties,163
promised to address Malaysia’s international labor regulation gap by
providing “binding and fully enforceable obligations” to protect
workers in Malaysia and the United States from exploitation. 164 In
159. Compa, supra note 37, at 152.
160. Meyer, supra note 31, at 501.
161. Compa, supra note 37, at 152 n.4.
162. See generally Holger Janusch, Labor Standards in U.S. Trade Politics, 49 J. WORLD
TRADE 1047, 1060-65 (2015).
163. See Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs, Labor Standards in the TPP, in TRANS-PACIFIC
PARTNERSHIP: AN ASSESSMENT 261, 265–66 (Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs & Jeffrey J. Schott eds.,
2016).
164. The Trans-Pacific Partnership, U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/sites/
default/files/TPP-Protecting-Workers-Fact-Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/G3QH-DYJ9].
TPP helps improve conditions on the ground in TPP countries, by using binding and
fully enforceable obligations to: Protect the freedom to form unions and bargain
collectively; Eliminate exploitative child labor and forced labor; Protect against
employment discrimination; Require laws on acceptable conditions of work related
to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health; Prevent the
degradation of labor protections in export processing zones; Combat trade in goods
made by forced labor in countries inside and outside TPP.
Id.
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January 2017, however, the United States Trade Representative
(“USTR”) announced the United States’ withdrawal from the TPP.165
As a result, Malaysian labor practice remains unregulated while many
other actors in international trade are regulated; the situation, therefore,
presents a prisoner’s dilemma 166 to parties to other agreements with
labor standards by only providing incentives to cooperate if
participating countries believe that the benefits of cooperation
outweigh the costs. 167 In the absence of the TPP, there is no binding
agreement on Malaysia, and a unilateral move (such as filing a CVD
petition against Malaysia) may be the only available means to preserve
international labor regulation and to prevent the Government of
Malaysia from exploiting a gap in the international regulatory
framework to gain an unfair competitive advantage in trade. 168
The idea of using trade law to discipline poor labor standards is
not a new one. 169 In earlier articles, within the context of NAFTA, the
possibility of using CVD as a disciplinary mechanism was raised and
dismissed because of its association with protectionism.170
Commentators in the 1990s concluded that applying CVD law to lax
regulatory labor standards would likely require a change in the statute
because Commerce would be reluctant to interpret the statute’s
provisions in a way that linked labor and trade standards because the
executive branch was pushing for trade liberalization and promoted the
free market. 171 In the period following the passage of NAFTA, using
165. The United States Officially Withdraws from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, U.S.
TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/pressreleases/2017/january/US-Withdraws-From-TPP [https://perma.cc/7LEM-Q893].
166. See ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 7-12 (2006) (defining
the prisoner’s dilemma as a theoretic concept that refers to bargaining situations where two
people, acting selfishly and without cooperation, will come to a less ideal outcome than they
would if they cooperated. A true prisoner’s dilemma means that participants are unable to
communicate with one another when entering into agreements that dictate each other’s future
choices and is often used as an analogy for international relations in situations where there is a
lack of formal regulation).
167. “[A]void the adverse consequences of a prisoner’s dilemma, in which each
participant, unsure of whether the others will cooperate, engages in behavior that is less optimal
than cooperative behavior.” Supra note 24, at 83.
168. See supra Part IV.
169. See generally Wilcox, supra note 143; Janusch, supra note 162, at 1060-65.
170. Benjamin Rozwood & Andrew R. Walker, Side Agreements, Sidesteps, and
Sideshows: Protecting Labor from Free Trade in North America, 34 HARV. INT’L L.J. 333, 348
(1993).
171. Trachtman, supra note 24, at 92.
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CVD to discipline poor labor standards received less frequent
discussion, perhaps due in part to the emergence and increasing use of
labor-provisions in bilateral and multilateral 172 agreements. 173
The withdrawal of the United States from the TPP removes the
possibility of an explicit trade labor linkage between the United States
and Malaysia, which leaves few alternatives to parties seeking to
discipline Malaysian unfair labor practices that harm migrants in
Malaysia and weaken the competitiveness of United States labor.174
However, despite its withdrawal from the TPP, the USTR’s changed
course in trade politics may signal a willingness to use trade law 175 to
discipline foreign labor violations that undermine the US labor
market. 176 The United States executive branch recently began
rethinking its approach to trade policy further to an Executive Order
demanding a change to trade policy. 177 Evidence of these changes can
be seen in Commerce’s call for notice and comment in 2017, where the
executive branch announced its intention to investigate policies that
address the trade deficit that the United States has with significant
trading partners. 178 As part of this effort, the executive branch has
shown a clear interest in investigating the relationship with countries
like Malaysia and examining potential linkages between the depressed
172. Axel Marx et al.., The Protection of Labour Rights in Trade Agreements: The Case
of the EU-Colombia Agreement, 50 J. WORLD TRADE 587, 588 (2016).
173. Janusch, supra note 162, at 1060-66.
174. K.S. Jomo, Malaysia Urged to Withdraw Gracefully from Bad Trade Deal, THE STAR
(Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.thestar.com.my/business/business-news/2018/08/13/withdrawgracefully-from-bad-trade-deal/ [https://perma.cc/RMB2-MMS4].
175. Jacob M. Schlesinger, New Nafta Shows Trump’s Trade Strategy for Balancing
Labor, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-nafta-shows-trumpstrade-strategy-for-balancing-labor-business-interests-1538386203
[https://perma.cc/8SFK6WFY].
176. Billy Melo Araujo, Labour Provisions in EU and Mega-Regional Trade Agreements:
Rhetoric and Reality, 67 INT’L COMP. L. Q. 233 (2018).
177. “Pursuant to Executive Order 13786 of March 31 2017, the Secretary of Commerce
and the United States Trade Representative (USTR), in consultation with the Secretaries of State,
the Treasury, Defense, Agriculture, and Homeland Security and the heads of any other executive
departments or agencies with relevant expertise, as determined by the Secretary of Commerce
and the USTR, shall prepare and submit to the President an Omnibus Report on Significant
Trade Deficits.” Public Comments and Hearing Regarding Administration Report on Significant
Trade Deficits, FED. REGISTER (Apr. 17, 2017), https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2017/04/17/2017-07827/public-comments-and-hearing-regarding-administrationreport-on-significant-trade-deficits [https://perma.cc/F8D6-P3VR]; Exec. Order No. 13,786, 82
Fed. Reg. 18110 (2017).
178. See Public Comments, supra note 177.
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wages in the US manufacturing industry and the “denial of worker
rights and labor standards” by trade partners with which it has large
trade deficits. 179 The US executive branch may therefore be willing to
open an investigation against Malaysia because:
1) the United States is one of Malaysia’s top five exporting
destinations for electronics, 180
2) the Government of Malaysia creates unfair competitive
advantages that American labor cannot match 181 by permitting
large-scale labor violations that artificially depress the cost of
labor in Malaysia, 182 and
3)

the United States has large trade deficits with Malaysia. 183

A. The Possibility of Judicial Review
As noted at the end of Part III, whether Commerce accepts or
rejects a CVD petition alleging a “regulatory subsidy,” either decision
would be subject to judicial review by the petitioner or the
respondent. 184 When Congress drafts statutes broadly, as it has done by
179. Exec. Order No. 13,786, 82 Fed. Reg. 18110 (2017).
180. Malaysia Export Statistics, GLOBALEDGE, https://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/
malaysia [https://perma.cc/K6M9-Z7PR].
Malaysia is a major electronics producer and exporter. The electrical & electronics
(E&E) industry is the leading sector in Malaysia’s manufacturing sector, contributing
significantly to the country’s manufacturing output (26.94 percent), exports (48.7
percent) and employment (32.5 percent). In 2010, the gross output of the industry
totaled US$50.94 billion, exports amounted to US$75.7 billion and created
employment opportunities for 325,696 people. The major export destinations are
USA, China and Singapore while the major import destinations are Taiwan, USA and
South Korea.
Electrical and Electronics Industry in Malaysia, FACTS & DETAILS,
http://factsanddetails.com/southeast-asia/Malaysia/sub5_4e/entry-3697.html
[https://perma.cc/U8RE-EX4L].
181. Houseman et al., supra note 7, at 12-14.
182. See supra Section II.A.
183. USTR data show that in 2013—the latest aggregate data available—Malaysia was
the United States’ seventeenth largest supplier of import goods, with US$27 billion in imports
in 2013, US$14.8 billion of which came from Malaysia’s E&E sector; In E&E, the United States
only exports US$5.4 billion worth of goods to Malaysia, creating a US$9 billion deficit of U.S.
E&E trade with Malaysia. See Malaysia, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/southeast-asia-pacific/malaysia
[https://perma.cc/V3ZD-5BKJ].
184. See supra note 137.
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leaving the definition of ‘subsidy’ relatively open in the CVD statute,
one cannon of interpretation from Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills suggests that Commerce implicitly delegates power to the
judiciary to expand the federal common law in matters like trade, which
are of clear federal interest. 185 Even though trade is a matter of federal
interest under the Lincoln Mills cannon, a reviewing court may still be
reluctant to interpret the CVD statute in a manner that expands the law
to address gaps in the regulatory framework and could express
concerns that it is up to Congress, and not the judiciary, to specifically
address such gaps through legislation. A chief concern in broadening
the definition of subsidy to include a government’s failure to regulate
a certain market may be that sanctioning a government’s inaction (a
failure to regulate domestic labor markets) could allow Commerce to
apply CVDs to cheap goods exported from countries with governments
that lack the capacity to regulate. 186 Therefore, a reviewing court could
185. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451 (1957) (holding that a
broadly worded statute in an area of federal interest “authorizes federal courts to fashion a body
of federal law”). Another example of broadly worded federal statutes deemed as open to federal
common law expansion is the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-38, which makes unlawful
“[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,” which is an area where
federal courts have developed a vast area of federal common law interpreting the statute. See
Jay Tidmarsh, A Theory of Federal Common Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 585, 590 n.26 (2006).
186. See generally Alf Hornborg, Why You Can’t Have Free Trade and Save the Planet,
THE CONVERSATION (Apr. 30, 2018), https://theconversation.com/why-you-cant-have-freetrade-and-save-the-planet-94128 [https://perma.cc/PQ3G-GKWE]; Alexander Tziamalis,
Explainer: What is Protectionism and Could it Benefit the US Economy?, THE CONVERSATION
(Mar. 1, 2017), https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-protectionism-and-could-itbenefit-the-us-economy-73706 [https://perma.cc/H37R-BFLE]; Fred Smith, Reflections on the
Evolution of Trade Policy, FORBES (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/fredsmith/
2017/11/03/reflections-on-the-evolution-of-trade-policy/#63bb8e811c45
[https://perma.cc/
PBJ7-4YNX]; Otto Graf Lambsdorff et al., Yes, Protectionism is a Promising Tool for Domestic
Producers to Safeguard Their Margins, THE INT’L ECON. (2017), http://www.internationaleconomy.com/TIE_Su07_TradeEnvSymp.pdf [https://perma.cc/2FGZ-2M4J]; Jeff Faux, U.S.
Trade Policy—Time to Start Over, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.epi.org/
publication/u-s-trade-policy-time-to-start-over/ [https://perma.cc/JTJ5-PKE7]; James Roberts,
How Western Environmental Policies Are Stunting Economic Growth in Developing Countries,
THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 24, 2011), https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/howwestern-environmental-policies-are-stunting-economic-growth-developing [https://perma.cc/
RJ6F-MSLK]; THE INT’L ECON., ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF EU PRECAUTION-BASED
STANDARDS ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2004), https://www.wto.org/english/forums_
e/ngo_e/posp47_nftc_enlightened_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/WD66-PJ5G]; FLORIS VAN HEES,
PROTECTION V. PROTECTIONISM: THE USE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE DEBATE FOR AND
AGAINST THE LIBERALISATION OF TRADE (2004), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/
download?doi=10.1.1.135.4282&rep=rep1&type=pdf [https://perma.cc/8M4C-SRQA]; Makau
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either uphold a negative determination (finding no subsidy in
Malaysia’s labor policy) or reverse a positive determination (a finding
of a subsidy in Malaysia’s labor policy) by Commerce, fearing
broadening the scope of the CVD statute would threaten to open the
floodgates of CVD petitions against any government’s action or
inaction that could bear the label of a regulatory subsidy.
While the fear of opening the floodgates is understandable, such
a fear would be unwarranted in the case of Malaysia. The approach this
Note advocates keeps the definition of a subsidy within the legal
framework set out under both the SCM Agreement 187 and the
definitions of subsidy under Section 1677(5)—as noted in Section
III(A), the SCM Agreement, in Annex (e), 188 makes specific mention
of government actions that exempt industrial enterprises from taxes.189
The labor environment in Malaysia is not the result of the government
being unable to enact regulation, but has rather been created by specific
programs of deregulation. 190 Therefore, a reviewing court that accepted
the theory of a subsidy suggested in this Note would not open the
floodgates of CVD petitions because of the fact specific situation of
Malaysia exploiting international regulatory gaps and taking purposive
deregulatory action to shift social welfare charges away from industry
and onto the labor force. 191 Therefore, one may allay prudential
concerns about opening the floodgates of CVD petitions by limiting the
expanded application of a subsidy in CVD proceedings to the extent of
the definitions in Annex A of the SCM Agreement. 192
V. CONCLUSION: DISINCENTIVIZING SOCIAL DUMPING
Unless action is taken to disincentivize Malaysia from using
MIDA 193 to offer benefits to manufacturers that are underwritten by a
hidden reality of forced labor, it is unlikely that the downward pressure
on wages in the global manufacturing market will stop because
international labor standards are not strongly enforced, and the US
W. Mutua & Robert L. Howse, Protecting Human Rights in a Global Economy: Challenges for
the World Trade Organization, 6 HUM. RTS. DEV. ONLINE 51 (1999).
187. SCM Agreement, supra note 123, at ¶ 1.
188. See supra notes 148-65.
189. See supra note 148.
190. See supra Section II.C.2.
191. See supra Section II.A.
192. SCM Agreement, supra note 123, at Annex I.
193. See Why Malaysia, supra note 20.
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withdrawal from the TPP means that Malaysia’s policies are otherwise
unregulated. If CVDs supply needed legal pressure that disincentivizes
the Malaysian Government’s policy path-dependence of relying on
exploited migrant labor for economic gains, then the ends would justify
the means. The international regulatory framework as applied to labor
standards supplies few disincentives to governments who enact policies
that discriminate against migrant labor, which undermines the global
effort to create a baseline for labor standards. At the very least,
characterizing the Malaysian government’s deregulation as a subsidy
provides a chance to fill the regulatory gap and establish an economic
incentive to uphold basic labor standards that protect vulnerable
Malaysian migrant laborers as well as economically disempowered US
manufacturing laborers.

